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PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL 
The parties to this appeal and to the trial court proceedings are listed in the 
case caption. 
TURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial District Court, Hon. 
Judith S. H. Atherton, granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee 
David L. McCann, M.D., and dismissing Plaintiff Robert Joseph's complaint against 
him. Originally filed in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2(3) (j) (2002), this appeal was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
and 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment, dismissing 
Plaintiff Joseph's medical malpractice claim against Dr. McCann, upon the ground 
that Dr. McCann, who examined Plaintiff as an independent examiner retained by 
Salt Lake City, owed no duty of care toward Plaintiff? 
2. Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment on the alternative 
ground that Plaintiffs medical malpractice claim was barred by the two-year 
limitations period contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (2002)? 
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Appellate review of a grant of summary judgment is basically identical to that 
of the trial court: facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
summary judgment. The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed without 
deference. The question whether disputed issues of material fact exist, and therefore 
require trial, is a question of law upon which this Court accords no deference to the 
trial court. See, e.g., Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332,1334 (Utah 1977). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, AND RULES 
The standard for granting summary judgment, set forth in Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c), states: 'The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
The pertinent provisions of Utah's Health Care Malpractice Act, setting forth 
the limitations period for initiating a claim of malpractice, found in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-144 (2002), state as follows: 
(1) No malpractice against a health care provider may be 
brought unless it is commenced within two years after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through use of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs,..., except that:... 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that the patient 
has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the 
-2-
part of the health care provider because that health care 
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal 
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless 
commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence, 
should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, 
whichever first occurs. 
The texts of any other pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are set 
forth in the argument sections of this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By complaint filed in October 2003, Plaintiff Robert Joseph leveled a claim of 
"Medical Malpractice" against Dr. McCann, a psychiatrist who had performed an 
independent medical evaluation (IME) upon Plaintiff, to evaluate Plaintiffs fitness 
for duty as a Salt Lake City police officer. According to Plaintiff, Dr. McCann's IME 
was conducted improperly, yielding a negative evaluation that led to termination 
of Plaintiffs employment. Within his claim of medical malpractice, Plaintiff also 
accused Dr. McCann of "libel, slander, conspiracy, negligence, fraud, and 
racketeering .... (R. 3-12, copied in Appendix A of this Brief, emphasis added.) 
After discovery, Dr. McCann moved for summary judgment on two, 
alternative grounds: (1) that as an independent medical evaluator, he had no 
physician-patient relationship with Plaintiff, and hence, no duty of care to support 
a claim of malpractice; and (2) that even if a malpractice action could lie against Dr. 
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McCann, Plaintiff's complaint was time-barred under the two-year limitations 
period of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. (R. 85.) 
Upon briefing and argument, the trial court granted summary judgment on 
both grounds. (R. 553-54, Br. of Appellant Attachment A.) Plaintiff then filed a 
motion to alter or amend the trial court's judgment, which motion was denied. (R. 
567-68; R. 579, Br. of Appellant Attachment B.) This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff - Robert Joseph was employed by Salt Lake City (SLC) as a Police 
Officer in 1997. (R. 85.) 
2. Shooting Incident - In March 1999, Plaintiff was involved in an incident 
wherein he shot and injured a motorist while acting as a SLC Police Officer ("Shooting 
Incident"). (R. 4, 85.) 
3. Suspension of Plaintiff - As a result of the Shooting Incident, Plaintiff was 
suspended, and then terminated, by SLC as a police officer. (R. 123,125.) 
4. Reinstatement of Plaintiff - In January 2000, SLC reinstated Plaintiff as 
a police officer. As part of this reinstatement, Plaintiff was required to submit to an 
IME. (R.125.) 
5. David L. McCann - Dr. McCann is a medical doctor and has a specialty 
in the field of Psychiatry. In January 2000, Dr. McCann was retained by SLC to 
perform an IME of Plaintiff. Assistant City Attorney Lyn Creswell supplied 
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personnel records of Plaintiff for Dr. McCann's review, and also wrote a letter to Dr. 
McCann (the "Creswell letter") expressing concerns that Plaintiff had "appeared 
threatening" in his behavior. (R. 4,7,17; R. 193, copied in Appendix B of this Brief.) 
6. IME/IME Report - Dr. McCann commenced his IME of Plaintiff in early 
February, 2000 - this included a review of personnel records and related materials 
furnished to Dr. McCann by SLC. Dr. McCann also had psychological testing done 
and performed a psychiatric interview of Plaintiff on February 3,2000. At the time 
of the IME interview, Plaintiff signed a written "Statement of Conditions for 
Independent Medical Evaluation, which included an acknowledgment that Dr. 
McCann's role was to provide his assessment to SLC and "not treatment" to 
Plaintiff. (R. 128, Br. of Appellant Attachment E.) Plaintiff Joseph also admitted, in 
his deposition, that "I knew I wasn't going [to Dr. McCann] for treatment." (R. 86, 
103-04). Dr. McCann completed his IME Report on February 28,2000 and provided 
it to SLC. (R.17.) 
7. Consultations About IME - A copy of Dr. McCann's IME Report was 
provided to Plaintiff and his attorney on or about March 14,2000. Through March 
and April, 2000, Plaintiff and his counsel consulted two psychologists concerning 
the IME Report; a third psychologist was consulted by mid-year. Those 
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consultations caused Plaintiff to believe that Dr. McCann was "in error" in his IME. 
(R. 105-15.) 
8. Plaintiffs Termination by Salt Lake City Corporation - Based in part 
upon Dr. McCann's IME Report, SLC terminated Plaintiff as a Police Officer on 
March 31,2000. (R. 9,17.) See also Joseph v. SLC Civil Service Comm'n, 2002 UT App. 
254 t 2-3, 53 P.3d 11,13-14 (copied in Br. of Appellant Attachment C). 
9. Appeal of Termination Decision - On April 5, 2000, Plaintiff, through 
counsel, appealed his termination to the SLC Civil Service Commission 
("Commission"). As part of the Request for Appeal, Plaintiff contended that Dr. 
McCann was at fault in the IME. Plaintiff alleged in part as follows: 
Dr. McCann did not conduct a complete and competent 
evaluation,... The evaluation is incomplete and inadequate. 
(Emphasis added.) The paragraph criticizing Dr. McCann's evaluation contained 
specific allegations of deficiencies, consistent with the psychologist consultations as 
described by Plaintiff. (R. 130-33, copied in Appendix C of this Brief.) 
10. Dismissal of Appeal - Plaintiff failed to comply with discovery requests 
from SLC while his case was pending before the Commission. Accordingly, on 
April 9,2001, the Commission dismissed Plaintiffs appeal of his termination. Joseph 
v. SLC Civil Service Comm'n, 2002 UT App. 254 | 3-5,53 P.3d at 14. 
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11. Affirmation of Termination/Dismissal - The action of the Commission 
in dismissing Plaintiffs appeal of the termination was affirmed by the Utah Court 
of Appeals in Joseph v. SLC Civil Service Comm'n, supra. 
12. Initiation of Medical Malpractice Claim - On April 23, 2003, Plaintiff 
initiated his claim against Dr. McCann for medical malpractice by filing a Notice of 
Intent to Commence Legal Action and contemporaneously filing a Request for 
Prelitigation Screening Panel, in accordance with the provisions of the Utah 
Healthcare Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 (2002). (R. 14, "Time Line," 
copied in Appendix D of this Brief.) 
13. Civil Complaint Filed - Subsequently, on October 14,2003, Plaintiff filed 
his civil complaint against Dr. McCann, accusing him of "Medical Malpractice" 
based on conduct which allegedly constituted "libel, slander, conspiracy, negligence, 
fraud, and racketeering ...." (R. 3-12.) 
14. Grant of Summary Judgment - After discovery in the malpractice case, 
on April 25, 2005, the trial court granted Dr. McCann's motion for summary 
judgment, entering an order of dismissal with prejudice. (R. 553-54.) Plaintiff 
moved to alter or amend that judgment, which motion was denied on September 19, 
2005. (R.579.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs complaint upon the 
ground that no physician-patient relationship existed between Dr. McCann and 
Plaintiff Joseph. Under Utah law, the absence of such relationship defeats an 
allegation of a duty owed toward the Plaintiff. Statutory provisions in the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act also establish that Dr. McCann was not a care provider 
for Plaintiff, and therefore, cannot be held liable as such. Case law from Utah and 
other jurisdictions addressing the relationship of an independent examiner to a 
plaintiff, and the policy considerations supporting such case law, also amply 
support the trial court's judgment in this case. 
2. The trial court also correctly concluded, alternatively, that Plaintiffs 
medical malpractice action against Dr. McCann was time-barred under the two-year 
limitations period of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Plaintiff discovered 
evidence to support his malpractice action no later than April 5, 2000, but did not 
commence that action until more than three years later, on April 23,2003. Plaintiffs 
bid to extend the limitations period, based upon "fraudulent concealment/' also 
fails: Plaintiff alleged fraud in his untimely complaint, and his discovery of evidence 
purporting to support that allegation, during litigation of that complaint, did not 




The Trial Court Correctly Held that Dr. McCann, as an 
Independent Medical Examiner Employed by Salt Lake 
City, had No Duty of Care toward Plaintiff that Could 
Support a Medical Malpractice Claim 
"To establish negligence... a plaintiff must first establish a duty of care owed 
by defendant to plaintiff.... The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question 
of law to be determined by the court/7 Ferre v. State, 784 P.2d 149,151 (Utah 1989) 
(quoted and followed in Smith v. Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919, 923-24 (Utah 2004)). No such 
duty existed in this case between Dr. McCann and Plaintiff. 
A. Utah Case Law. 
As applied to medical malpractice, when a physician has no physician-patient 
relationship with an individual, the physician owes no duty to that individual, and 
a malpractice lawsuit fails as a matter of law. In Wilcox v. Salt Lake City Corp., 26 
Utah 2d 78,484 P.2d 1200 (1971), plaintiff sought to sue physicians who contracted 
with the City to read x-rays for health screening, and mis-read plaintiffs x-ray, 
missing signs of a tubercular condition. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
summary judgment in favor of the physicians: "since the doctor's duty was to the 
City, they had no doctor-patient relationship" with the plaintiff. 484 P.2d at 1201. 
.9-
Just as the physicians in Wilcox had no duty of care to the x-rayed individuals, 
Dr. McCann had no duty of care toward Plaintiff Joseph. Like the physicians in 
Wilcox, Dr. McCann was retained by SLC, not by the examinee, Plaintiff Joseph. The 
"Statement of Conditions for Independent Medical Examination" (R. 128, Br. of 
Appellant Attachment E), signed by Plaintiff Joseph, made this explicit: "It is Dr. 
McCann's role to provide evaluation and not treatment." The "Statement of 
Conditions" further clarified that Dr. McCann would release his evaluation to the 
City, and not to Plaintiff or his attorney. 
B. Utah Statutory Authority. 
A conclusion that Dr. McCann had no duty toward Plaintiff Joseph is further 
supported by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, which defines "health care" as 
"any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been 
performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient 
during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement." Utah Code Ann. § 78-
14-3(10) (Supp. 2005). As an independent examiner, Dr. McCann was not providing 
medical care or treatment to or on behalf of Plaintiff Joseph. He was performing a 
service for SLC. 
Nor was Plaintiff a "patient" of Dr. McCann under the Malpractice Act, 
despite his misidentification as such in the "Statement of Conditions." "'Patient7 
-10-
means a person who is under the care of a health care provider, under a contract, 
express or implied/7 Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(22) (Supp. 2005). Although the 
"Statement of Conditions" twice mis-labeled Plaintiff Joseph as a "patient," it 
otherwise made plain, as quoted earlier, that Plaintiff was being evaluated, not 
treated, by Dr. McCann. Furthermore, Plaintiff Joseph admitted: "I knew I wasn't 
going [to Dr. McCann] for treatment." (R. 104.) Once again, the contract for service 
was not between Dr. McCann and Plaintiff Joseph; it was between Dr. McCann and 
Salt Lake City. Because Dr. McCann was not under contract, expressed or implied, 
to provide healthcare to Plaintiff, there was no physician-patient relationship, and 
he owed no duty of care toward Plaintiff. 
C. Case Law from Other Jurisdictions. 
Cases from other jurisdictions are in accord with the above analysis. See, e.g., 
Martinez v. Lewis, 969 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1998) (En Banc) (independent examiner 
engaged by insurer had no physician-patient relationship and owed no duty to 
plaintiff-insured); Hafner v. Beck, 185 Ariz. 389,916 P.2d 1105 (Ct. App. 1995) (duty 
ran from the independent medical examiner to the insurance carrier who retained 
him - not to the examinee); Keene v. Wiggins, 69 Cal. App.3d 308 (1977) (physician 
retained by employer to conduct IME of an injured employee had a duty of care and 
preparation of the report to employer - not to the employee); Rogers v. Hovath, 65 
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Mich. App. 644, 237 N.W.2d 595 (1975) (physician retained by insurance carrier to 
conduct an IME had no physician/patient relationship with plaintiff who lost 
insurance benefits based upon the results of the IME); Violandi v. City of New York, 
184 A.D.2d 364, 584 N.Y.S.3d 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (physician/patient 
relationship did not exist when the examination is conducted on behalf of an 
employer); Tomko v. Marks, 412 Pa. Super. 54, 602 A.2d 890 (1992) (plaintiff did not 
have a valid medical malpractice claim when the IME was conducted solely at the 
request of plaintiffs employer). The court in Martinez v. Lewis, supra, noted "that 
this conclusion is in accord with virtually every other court to consider this issue. 
969P.2dat219. 
D. Policy Considerations. 
The policy reasons behind this rule were outlined by the Arizona Court of 
Appeals in Hafner v. Beck, supra. In Hafner, a psychologist performed an IME of 
plaintiff at the request of a workers compensation carrier. The Arizona Court 
affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the psychologist: 
A medical malpractice suit such as this will lie only when 
there was a doctor/patient relationship creating a duty to 
act for the patient's benefit. ... Because no such 
doctor/patient relationship existed between Beck and 
Hafner, the trial court correctly ruled that Beck owed no 
duty to Hafner under these circumstances. 
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The Hafner court went on to quote with approval from Davis v. Tirrell, 443 N.Y.S.2d 
136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) as follows: 
To permit such an action would make it impossible to find 
any expert witness willing to risk a lawsuit based on his 
testimony as to his opinions and conclusions before any 
tribunal. And such cause of action if permitted would 
lead to an endless stream of litigation .... 
Hafner, 916 P.2d at 1108 (quoting Davis, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 140). 
In light of the foregoing analysis, authority, and policy considerations, the trial 
court correctly held that Dr. McCann "owed no legal duty to plaintiff from which 
a legal action could be commenced[.]" (R. 554.) On this point, the trial court's 
judgment, and its order dismissing Plaintiffs complaint, should be affirmed. 
POINT TWO 
The Trial Court Correctly Held that Plaintiffs Claim of 
Medical Malpractice, Filed More than Two Years after 
Learning the Basis for Such Claim, was Barred by the 
Limitations Period of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act. 
As explained in Point One, Plaintiff has no medical malpractice claim against 
Dr. McCann, because Dr. McCann owed no duty of care to Plaintiff. But even if such 
duty existed, the trial court correctly concluded, alternatively, that Plaintiffs claims 
were barred by the limitations period specified in the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act. 
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A. No Claim Within Two Years of Discovering Legal Injury. 
The limitations period of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (2002) provides, in 
pertinent part: 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years 
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after 
the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or 
occurrence,... 
The statute of limitations in a malpractice action begins to run when "an injured 
person knows or should know he has suffered a legal injury." Foil v. Bollinger, 601 
P.2d 144,147 (Utah 1979). A "legal injury" exists when the "injured person knew 
or should have known that he had sustained an injury and that the injury was 
caused by negligent action." Id. at 148. 
In this case, Plaintiff knew of Dr. McCann's alleged malpractice and that this 
had caused him to be injured (terminated), i.e. "legal injury," no later than April 5, 
2000, when he filed his Request for Appeal Hearing with the SLC Civil Service 
Commission. (R. 130-33, Appendix C of this Brief.) In that Request, Plaintiff 
specifically alleged that "Dr. McCann did not conduct a complete and competent 
evaluation," and made specific allegations of deficiencies in Dr. McCann's IME and 
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IME report. He did not commence his malpractice claim against Dr. McCann until 
April 23, 2003, when he filed his Notice of Intent to Commence Legal Action. 
Plaintiff acknowledged that by March 14, 2000, he and his attorney were 
provided with a copy of Dr. McCann's IME report, which opined that Plaintiff was 
not suitable for duty as a police officer. (R. 105-06.) Plaintiff and counsel then 
promptly contacted other experts to review Dr. McCann's IME report. As a result 
of these consultations, Plaintiff formed the opinion that Dr. McCann was at fault in 
his IME. Plaintiff testified in part as follows: 
Q. So that [consultations with psychologists] led you 




Furthermore, based upon the possibility that Plaintiff did not obtain 
consultation with a third psychologist until mid-year 2000, the trial court correctly 
determined that Plaintiff's malpractice action was untimely commenced: "I am in 
agreement with the defendant that at the outside the statute began running June 15th 
of 2000, and terminated June 15th of 2002 ...." (R. 590 p. 23.) 
As can be seen from the foregoing, Plaintiff waited well over two years from 
the time he learned of his "legal injury," until he initiated his malpractice action 
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against Dr. McCann on April 23, 2003. The trial court correctly held that his claim 
was time barred.1 
B. No Exception for Fraudulent Concealment. 
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. McCann "fraudulently] concealed]77 the "true 
nature" of his contract with Salt Lake City to perform an IME. (Br. of Appellant p. 
18-22.) Plaintiff thereby attempts to invoke a statutory exception to the normal two-
year medical malpractice claim limitations period: 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that the patient has 
been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part 
of the health care provider because that health care 
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal 
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless 
commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence, 
should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, 
whichever first occurs. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(l)(b) (2002). 
Plaintiffs allegation of fraudulent concealment is based upon the letter to Dr. 
McCann from assistant Salt Lake City Attorney Lyn Creswell (Appendix B of this 
1
 Plaintiff had previously served Dr. McCann with a Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action dated September 23,2002, and then a second Notice of Intent 
dated February 9, 2003. However, no Request for Prelitigation Review was filed 
within 60 days after either of those Notices, which invalidated them pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(a) (2002). However, even the earlier of those two 
notices was tardy under the two-year limitations period. (R. 14, Appendix D of 
this Brief.) 
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Brief), written shortly before the February 2000 IME. In that letter, Creswell 
expressed particular concerns about Plaintiffs behavior, and asked Dr. McCann to 
contact him about his IME. The Creswell letter was disclosed during discovery in 
this lawsuit, on January 25,2004. (R. 590 p. 18; Br. of Appellant p. 14.) 
Read in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Creswell letter does not show 
that the fundamental elements of his malpractice action - injury (termination), 
caused by alleged negligence ("legal injury"), were concealed from him. Again, 
Plaintiff knew the facts supporting those elements as early as March 14, 2000, and 
no later than mid-June, 2000. His subsequent discovery of the Creswell letter, after 
the untimely, April 23, 2003 initiation of his malpractice claim, cannot change the 
date when he acquired knowledge of those operative facts, and therefore cannot 
retroactively extend the time to file his malpractice claim. 
The Creswell letter, according to Plaintiff, provides "evidence to support the 
claim of fraud" that Plaintiff alleged in his untimely complaint. However, Plaintiff 
had already made allegations of "fraud" and "conspiracy" in his Complaint For 
example, Plaintiff alleged that the IME was arranged by SLC "with the negative 
finding of unfitness planned beforehand." (Complaint f 39.) He alleged that the 
final IME report was "changed" at the behest of a SLC official. (Complaint f 40.) He 
alleged that Dr. McCann "misrepresented himself to Plaintiff as being an 
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independent medical examiner/' and thereby "gained Plaintiff's confidence during 
the evaluation by deception." (Complaint f 48.) Further, he alleged that Dr. 
McCann "knowingly participated in the City's conspired scheme" to terminate 
Plaintiff's employment. (Complaint f 50.) Having done nothing more than 
(arguably) support fraud allegations that plaintiff had made in his complaint, the 
Creswell letter does not operate to make those allegations timely under the two-year 
limitations period of § 78-14-4(1), nor under the "fraudulent concealment" exception 
of subsection 78-14-4(1)(b). 
Put another way, Plaintiff's claim that Dr. McCann "deliberately concealed the 
origins of his malpractice" (Br. of Appellant p. 20), which origins were purportedly 
revealed in the Creswell letter, does not aid him. It is knowledge of the basic 
elements of the claim - injury caused by negligence or other fault, which Plaintiff 
possessed by early to mid-2000, that triggers or starts the time running. See Floyd v. 
Western Surgical Associates, 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah App. 1989); Schurman v. 
Shingleton, 26 P.3d 227, 231 (Utah 2001). 
Finally, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(16) (Supp. 2005), a "malpractice 
action against a health care provider" includes "any action against a health care 
provider ...." (emphasis added). In his complaint, Plaintiff Joseph did not allege a 
separate claim of fraud against Dr. McCann. Instead, such claim was subsumed 
-18-
within his malpractice claim. But even if the fraud claim had been separately 
alleged, it was still subject to the two-year limitations period of § 78-14-4(1). See 
Floyd, supra., at 404. Thus neither making that claim, nor subsequently discovering 
supporting evidence for the claim in the Creswell letter, operated to extend that 
limitations period. 
CONCLUSION 
Dr. McCann had no duty of care toward Plaintiff upon which a malpractice 
claim could be based. Additionally, even if a malpractice claim were permissible, 
Plaintiff failed to timely initiate such claim. For either or both of these reasons, the 
decision of the trial court, granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. McCann, 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this t ^ day of April, 2006 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
J. ANTHONY EY 
KEVIN MUto-T 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the (Q day of April, 2006, two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, first class, postage 
pre-paid to the following: 
D. Bruce Oliver 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Suite 210 
180 South 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
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• O.Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax:(801)595-0300 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. JOSEPH, an individual, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 




1 And Jury Demand 
) (Medical Malpractice) 
i CivilNo. 01092 d t ? 6 
) Judge J]MjL<~t&~^~ 
Plaintiff, Robert L. Joseph, by and through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, comes now 
and for his claim in controversy against the above-named defendant, complains and alleges as 
follows: 
JURISDICTION and VENUE. 
1. All of the relevant conduct of the parties occurred in the State of Utah, or were 
initiated within the State of Utah, or were finalized within the State of Utah. 
2. This is an action for damages in excess of $10,000.00, exclusive of costs and 
attorney fees. 
C3CHT Ji* PH I/. 55 
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3. All conduct complained of herein occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
(hereinafter "the incident") and that this Court is the proper Court to bring this action. Original 
jurisdiction is vested in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4,1953, as amended, and 
venue is proper to bring this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-13-5,1953, as amended. 
4. Plaintiff Joseph's medical malpractice claims are brought pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-1 et seq., 1953, as amended. 
PARTIES. 
5. Robert L. Joseph (hereinafter, the "Plaintiff Joseph" or "Plaintiff), is an 
individual citizen of the United States and resides in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
6. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiff states the defendant individual, 
David L. McCann, M.D. F.A.P.A. (hereinafter, the "Defendant McCann" or "Defendant") is a 
citizen of the United States, and was at the time relevant to the events complained of acting as a 
physician or health care provider in the Salt Lake City Area, as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 78-
14-3(12), 1953, as amended. 
7. Based upon information and belief, Plaintiff Joseph states the Defendant is a 
physician contract employee for the Salt Lake City Corporation providing professional 
psychological evaluations to another. 
NATURE OF THE CASE. 
8. Plaintiff Joseph was involved in a police-involved-shooting-incident on March 26, 
1999, while employed at the Salt Lake City police department ("SLCPD") and acting under color 
of authority as a police officer. During the shooting incident, the plaintiff was injured having 
been hit and thrown from a speeding vehicle. 
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9. On or about March 31,1999, Plaintiff Joseph was cleared of the shooting by the 
State of Utah's Crime Lab ("Crime Lab"); the Crime Lab concluded that Plaintiff Joseph fired 
his weapon in "self-defense" and that Plaintiff Joseph was a "victim" of an aggravated assault 
which predicated the shooting. 
10. In spite of the Crime Lab clearance, intending to make an example out of the 
Plaintiff, the City procured the criminal prosecution of Plaintiff Joseph alleging that Plaintiff 
Joseph had perpetrator an aggravated assault upon his assailant, vice versa of what the Crime Lab 
concluded. 
11. The prosecution was not procured with the intent to bring an offender to justice. 
12. Pending the criminal charges, Plaintiff Joseph was terminated from the SLCPD. 
13. On or about April 19, 1999, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office filed criminal 
charges against Plaintiff Joseph and he was arrested. 
14. During the pendency of the prosecution, the SLCPD and District Attorney's 
Office made a series of slanderous and libelous statements concerning Plaintiff Joseph. The 
statements were made intending to appease the public and win over the public's confidence in the 
SLCPD's handling of police-involved-shootings. 
15. When the truth was disclosed to Ernie Jones, the DA's prosecutor assigned to the 
case, on or about July 7, 1999; thereafter, Mr. Jones agreed to the dismissal of the action. 
16. At the time of the dismissal of on or about November 23, 1999, Judge Burton 
apologized to Plaintiff Joseph claiming the charges never should have been filed. 
17. As the prevailing party, immediately following the dismissal, Plaintiff Joseph's 
attorney, Loni Deland, conducted his own press conference on Plaintiff Joseph's behalf. 
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18. The press corps left the conference and sought the City's response. Being caught 
unaware of the dismissal or of the press conference, the City was embarrassed. 
19. The press conference was in the context of the criminal case and was privileged. 
20. Plaintiff Joseph claimed to have an actionable lawsuit against the City for 
malicious prosecution. 
21. In the face of all the controversy, Plaintiff Joseph was reinstated to duty on 
January 4,2000. 
22. On January 5, 2000, the Plaintiff Joseph met with Chief Connole, who on one 
hand welcomed Plaintiff Joseph back to the department. Then on the other hand "ordered" 
Plaintiff Joseph to submit to a fitness for duty evaluation with Defendant McCann. 
23. During the meeting, Chief Connole expressed that the order was "posturing" by 
the City's attorneys (the City's risk management), and he urged the Plaintiff to settle his claims 
against the City and not to take the shooting matter to the Civil Service. 
24. In an effort to further posture the City's position, on or about January 18, 2000, 
the City's risk manager contacted Richard Shepherd seeking a letter excusing the District 
Attorney for terminating its prosecution and claiming the City could proceed with its own 
administrative actions against the Plaintiff. The letter was prepared and delivered that same date. 
25. Then on January 25,2000, the Plaintiff met with David Greer, the Union 
President at the behest of risk management. 
26. The plaintiff was informed that the City refused to cover the plaintiffs defense 
costs, also a risk management decision. 
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27. Unbeknownst to David Greer, the meeting was tape recorded by Plaintiff Joseph 
who received a warning in advance of the meeting. However, the recording was later discovered 
by Mr. Greer when the recording devise fell out of the plaintiffs pocket. 
28. Disagreeing with Mr. Greer and his offensive demeanor, Plaintiff Joseph 
terminated the meeting, while maintaining his own composure and professionalism. 
29. Contrary to the information preserved in the tape recording, Mr. Greer reported to 
Defendant McCann that Plaintiff Joseph had an anger fit. 
30. On or about February 3,2000, the Plaintiff reported to Defendant McCann for his 
fitness for duty evaluation. The evaluation lasted less than 2 Vi hours with only an hour of 
meaningful examination due to Plaintiffs apparent reluctance to open up. 
31. The examination was based on a clinical interview with Plaintiff Joseph, a clinical 
information inventory, a mental status examination, a psychological testing, and a limited review 
of medical records. The defendant also possessed some performance evaluations and letters from 
Plaintiff Joseph's employer produced in 1998 through February 2000. 
32. The City's risk management office selectively provided only prejudicial material, 
intentionally withholding the majority of Plaintiff s file from the doctor. 
33. In the examination, the Defendant addressed David Greer's allegations of 
Plaintiffs so-called "anger fit," and discussed Plaintiffs lawsuit claims against the City 
concerning the March 26, 1999 shooting and subsequent criminal prosecution. 
34. The Plaintiff denied the allegations concerning the anger fit and offered his tape 
recording for the doctor to review. The doctor refused to accept the tape without an explanation. 
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35. The Plaintiff tape-recorded Defendant McCann's evaluation as well and admitted 
recording the evaluation when asked. 
36. When Plaintiff admitted recording it, the doctor abruptly terminated the 
evaluation, Defendant McCann abruptly terminated the evaluation and it was not reopened nor 
delegated to another health care provider for its completion. 
37. The evaluation consisted of insufficient information to conclude the diagnosis 
concluded by the Defendant. In order to adequately evaluate and diagnose the Plaintiff, the 
doctor is required to document and enduring and chronic pattern or inflexible personality traits 
and dysfunctional interactions consistent over a broad range of personal and social situations. 
38. An in-depth review did not occur in this case, Mr. Greer knew of Plaintiff Joseph 
for a relatively short period of time and the documents provided did not include information 
outside of the 1998-2000 period of employment. Demonstrated long-standing, continuing 
personality problems is necessary for Dr. McCann's diagnoses in this matter. 
39. The evaluation was at the behest of the City with the negative finding of unfitness 
planned beforehand. However, the Defendant believed he was immune from liability for his 
conduct believing no duty to Plaintiff Joseph was owed. Defendant insists that the Plaintiffs 
grievance is with the City alone. 
40. At the request of the City, Defendant McCann prepared a report and it was 
completed on February 28, 2000. Before the final report was prepared, Defendant McCann 
changed his initial evaluation after speaking to risk management's Martha Stonebrook. 
41. The February 28, 2000 report is evidence of City's corrupt persuasion over Dr. 
McCann in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1512. 
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42. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1512 it is illegal for anyone to corruptly persuade another 
person, or attempt to do so, or engages in misleading conduct towards another person with the 
intent to cause or induce any person to (1) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, 
or other object, from an official proceeding; or (2) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object 
with the intent to impair the objects's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding. 
43. Contrary to the ADA Guidelines, no other reasonable accommodations were 
recommended or offered. 
44. Relying on altered February 28, 2000 report, the City terminated Plaintiff Joseph 
from duty. The termination become effective March 31,2000. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Medical Malpractice) 
45. Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated herein by this reference. 
46. A physician or health care provider has a duty to exercise the same degree of 
learning, care and skill possessed by others in good standing practicing in the same medical field. 
47. In the performance of his physician or health care provider duties, the defendant 
breached his duties in the following manner: 
(A). He failed to adequately examine the Plaintiff; 
(B). He failed to timely and appropriately assess, diagnose and or offer 
treatment, if necessary, to Plaintiff Joseph-recommending termination is 
beyond the scope of a health care provider's role; 
(C). He failed to obtain other medical assistance when Plaintiff Joseph's tape 
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recorder fell out of his pocket in order to complete the examination; 
(D), He failed to timely secure the necessary medical consultations for Plaintiff 
Joseph to complete the examination process; 
(E). He failed to timely recommend medical care and treatment for Plaintiff 
Joseph, if appropriate; and 
(F). He failed to otherwise obtain or maintain proper medical treatment and 
diagnostic services for Plaintiff Joseph on February 3, 2000 and continuing 
thereafter. 
48. The Defendant did not act objectively and misrepresented himself to Plaintiff as 
being an independent medical examiner. The Defendant gained Plaintiffs confidence during the 
evaluation by his deception. 
49. Plaintiffs confidence was gained through Defendant's fraudulent statements and 
assurances of honesty of intentions and absence of malice. 
50. In reality, the Defendant knowingly participated in the City's conspired scheme to 
deprive Plaintiff Joseph of his employment. Defendant's role was voluntary and willful 
believing he was immune from liability. The defendant was wrong; he is required to exercise the 
same degree of learning, care and skill possessed by other in good standing practicing in the same 
medical field. 
51. The Defendant's acts and omissions were willful in that the Defendant recklessly 
disregarded the Plaintiff and his legal rights. 
52. The Defendant acted in a tortuous manner within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-3 (32), 1953, as amended. His legal wrongs include libel, slander, conspiracy, 
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negligence, fraud, and racketeering within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (for obstructing 
justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512). 
53. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid conduct, Plaintiff Joseph suffered 
severe economic losses including to property due to his retaliatory termination, to his special 
damage in a reasonable sum for loss income, front and back pay, and benefits (medical, dental, 
retirement, etc). 
54. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid conduct, Plaintiff Joseph suffered 
nonecomonic losses and should be compensated generally for pain, suffering and inconvenience 
in the sum provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-7.1, 1953, as amended. 
55. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid conduct, Plaintiff Joseph is 
entitled to punitive damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1, 1953, as amended and Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-7.1(4), 1953, as amended. 
56. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, 1953, as amended, and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-7.5, 1953, as amended., the Plaintiff retained the services of an attorney to bring this 
action. The Defendant should be ordered to reimburse Plaintiffs reasonable and necessary 
expenses. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Joseph demands a trial by jury and asks for judgment 
against the Defendant for the above-named claims, as follows: 
1. For an award of damages for economic losses for wages and benefits as are 
reasonable in the premises; 
2. For an award of damages for noneconomic losses as are reasonable in the 
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premises; 
3. For an award of damages for punitive damages as are reasonable in the premises; 
4. For an award of attorney's fees and costs as are reasonable in the premises; and 
5. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper in the 
premises. 
Dated 30th day of September, 2003. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Plaintiffs Address: Attorney for Plaintiff 
1156 East Lost Eden Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
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31 January 2000 
CONFIDENTIAL 
David McCann 
4190 South Highland Drive 
Suite 102 
Salt Laice City, Utah 8412* 
Re: Evaluation of Robert Joseph 
DearDr McCann. 
Encloscc" are relevant personnel records for Police Officer Robert "Rob" Jos^:\ 
Salt Lake City emplcvee Officei Joseph is scheduled for an evaluation with you m :-. tew 
days 
The City nas employed Officer Joseph since 1997. 
Officer Joseph was released from his employment in July 1999, and then 
reinstated m January 2000 (See attached letters.) Since his reirstatement I have received 
several reports that Officer loseph has expressed anger, and appeared threatening to 
other Police Department employes. Several City employees have expressed concern 
about Officer Joseph's threatening behavior The City is concerned about Officer 
Joseph's fitness to perform has duties as a police officer, and we axe concerned for the 
safety cf OUT employees. Upon the completion of > our evaluation Police Chisf Mac 
Connole and myself would like to meet with you to discuss your recommendations. 
I ask that, when complete, your written evaluation of Officer Joseph be sent 
duectly *o me 





assistant City Attorney 
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REQUEST FOR APPEAL HEARING BEFORE 
THE SALT LAKE CITY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
Rob Joseph Chief A. M. "Mac" Cannole 
Name of Applicant Person who took action being appealed 
1156 East Lost Eden Drive Salt Lake City Police Department 
Address (Street) Department, if applicable 
Sandv, Utah 84094 March 31, 2000 
City, State, Zip Code Date of Action 
(801)571-3098/ 
Phone: Home / Work 
J. Bruce Reading 
Appellate will be represented by 
SCALLEY & READING. P.C.. 261 East 300 South. Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Address: Street, City, State, Zip 
What is the action that is being appealed: 
Termination of Employment 
Please provide the facts regarding your appeal: (Attach additional pages, if necessary): 
Officer Rob Joseph's employment with SLPD was terminated on March 31, 2000 
because of a psychological evaluation finding him unfit for duty. Based upon that finding, Chief 
Cannole claimed that Officer Joseph is incapable of performing his duties as a police officer. 
This appeal follows shortly after the appeal of Officer Joseph's suspension of 20 days 
from the SLPD force. Officer Joseph was fired following the shooting, but was reinstated with a 
20-day suspension. The shooting incident occurred when Officer Joseph stopped a suspect who 
was speeding and driving under the influence of alcohol. Officer Joseph fired at the suspect after 
the suspect placed his vehicle in reverse causing the car door to strike Officer Joseph and carry 
lim backward. Officer Joseph fired his gun while on the vehicle, while being thrown from the 
/ehicle as he fell to the pavement. 
After this incident, Officer Joseph was interviewed by Michele Myers, and LCSW, and 
bund fit to continue as a police officer. 
Officer Joseph was criminally charged with aggravated assault by the Salt Lake County 
)istrict Attorney on April 23, 1999. On November 23, 1999, the judge in the case dismissed the 
criminal action when the District Attorney agreed that Officer Joseph's Motion to Dismiss was 
well taken and decide not to oppose the motion. 
Following his reinstatement, Officer Joseph underwent an evaluation as to his fitness to 
perform his duties. Officer Joseph has no knowledge of what issues were to be involved in the 
evaluation because he did not receive a copy of the instructions to the psychiatrist as was 
required by policy. Officer Joseph was interviewed by Dr. David L. McCann, a psychiatrist for 
the Department, to determine his fitness for duty. Officer Joseph was asked many questions 
during his interview with Dr. McCann regarding his court case, the incident in question and the 
police department's policies, but not about his mental and emotional state at the time of the 
shooting or any time thereafter. When speaking about Officer Joseph's actions at a union 
meeting, Officer Joseph said he had recorded the meeting and asked if Dr. McCann wanted to 
hear the tape to determine if he had acted in the manner alleged. Dr. McCann declined to hear 
the tape. Dr. McCann then asked if Officer Joseph was recording their conversation. When 
Officer Joseph told Dr. McCann that he was recording the conversation, Dr. McCann reacted 
negatively. Officer Joseph was later brought in for more testing, but was not interviewed again. 
Dr. McCann issued a report finding Officer Joseph unfit for duty. 
Officer Joseph and his counsel met with Chief Cannole to discuss the issues of his 
termination of his employment on March 14, 2000; however, Officer Joseph was terminated on 
March 31, 2000. 
Dr. McCann did not conduct a complete and competent evaluation. First, Dr. McCann 
did not receive a full employment file for Officer Joseph in that he only reviewed Officer 
Joseph's first two quarterly performance evaluations, and not the three more recent evaluations. 
There is also a missing commendation letter. Second, in his evaluation, Dr. McCann appears to 
give great weight to Union President David Greer's recitation of the events of a union meeting of 
January 25, 2000. Officer Joseph had tape recorded the meeting, but Dr. McCann did not listen 
to the recording. Dr. McCann did not speak with other individuals attending the meeting. Third, 
Dr. McCann felt it necessary to talk to Union President Greer about one incident, but not to 
Officer Joseph's current supervisor Sgt. Scott White about Officer Joseph's overall performance 
following his reinstatement. Fourth, in the evaluation, the only portion of the evaluation which is 
in bold type sets forth the fact that Officer Joseph tape recorded the interview with Dr. McCann. 
Based upon the fact that Dr. McCann reacted negatively during the interview when he discovered 
it was being recorded and then emphasized it in his evaluation leads to the issue of possible bias 
on the part of Dr. McCann. Fifth, Dr. McCann states in the evaluation that an Axis II personality 
disorder is the basis for his finding that Officer Joseph is unfit for duty. Such a personality 
disorder is usually diagnosed early in life and is diagnosable in early adolescence. Prior 
evaluations, including the extensive testing prior to employment with the police department, did 
not detect such a disorder. Dr. McCann's analysis misses or does not address the Axis IV 
psychosocial stressors of being fired, betrayed by the union and charged by his peers with a 
felony. The analysis does not address those stressors and the short-term nature of any resulting 
behavior from those stressors. The evaluation is incomplete and inadequate. 
If, in fact, Officer Joseph's fitness for duty is in question and sustained, it is inappropriate 
for SLPD to fire him rather than to employ some other remedy. SLPD is at least partially 
responsible by its actions for Officer Joseph's predicament. Officer Joseph was involved in a 
shooting, was criminally charged, was arrested and led to jail in front of his peers, was the target 
of negative media publicity, was called a liar by the department, had the criminal action 
dismissed immediately following the acquittal of another officer criminally charged in a separate 
incident, and now the department is washing its hands of Officer Joseph because it now says he 
is unfit for duty. SLPD has assisted other officers with problems without resorting to 
termination. Officer Joseph's actions have been reasonable under the circumstances; 
consequently termination of his employment is contrary to SLPD's policy. 




Dr. David L. McCann 
Dr. Leslie M. Cooper 
H. Michele Myers 
Sgt. Scott White 
Office Michael Hill 
Officer Bruce Evans 
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Officer Joseph may also call an expert as yet unidentified to critique the evaluation and/or 
provide an evaluation of Officer Joseph's fitness for duty. 
What records and other information do you request from the person who took the action 
which resulted in this appeal? 
A copy of all correspondence between SLPD and Dr. McCann; 
A copy of the report stating Officer Joseph was unfit for duty; 
A copy of Dr. McCann's notes; 
A copy of Officer Joseph's personnel file; and 
Copies of records relating to Officer Joseph's being found unfit for duty. 
What actions do you want the Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission to take? 
Reinstate Officer Joseph with full back pay and benefits or, in the alternative, reinstate 
Officer Joseph following efforts to bring Officer Joseph to a position of fitness for duty provided 
and paid for by Salt Lake City Police Department. 
I hereby request a hearing before the Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission. 
SignSroVof App^lant^ °~ 
fjsfm 
Date 
Submit this document to the Secretary of the Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission, 451 
South State Street, Room 115, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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